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The Global Crisis Reaches China: Unrest Spreads as Growth Stalls

China’s leaders are currently contending with declining demand, rising debt and a real estate bubble. Some factories are laying off workers, suffering financial losses or even closing as orders from crisis-plagued Europe dry up. The economic strains are frustrating workers and consumers in the country, threatening the political establishment and Beijing’s economic miracle.

This October was the third straight month Chinese exports decreased. Along with it, the hopes of German manufacturers that Asia’s growth market might help lift them out of the global crisis as it did in 2008 are also evaporating. This time China faces enormous challenges of its own — a real estate market bubble and local government debt — that could even pose a risk to the global economy.

Related article: Every Chinese Province bankrupt like Greece –  Chinese Regime nearly bankrupt  – 17.11.2011

A police special forces unit appears suddenly. One moment, a worker named Liu* is marching back and forth in front of city hall in Dongguan, China, with about 300 colleagues from the bankrupt factory Bill Electronic. “Give us back the money from our blood and sweat!” they chant.

The next moment, their shouts turn to screams as a few hundred uniformed police with helmets, shields and batons, along with numerous plainclothes security forces, leap out of olive green police vans. The demonstration leaders, including Liu, are rounded up on the side of the street by police dogs. Within just a few minutes’ time, the communist authorities have successfully suffocated the protest.

The men and women, most of them young adults, are packed into yellow buses and hauled back to their factory, where the government exerts massive pressure: By afternoon, they must consent to make do with 60 percent of the wages they are owed by the employment office. Anyone who refuses, officials warn, will receive nothing at all.

The new global crisis has reached China. Debt problems in Europe, the country’s most important trading partner, are starting to dim prospects here in the nation that has effectively become the world’s factory, as well. The unstable United States economy and threat of a trade war between the two superpowers make the situation even more uncertain. As the US presidential election campaign starts too heat up, American politicians are vying to outdo one another in protectionist declarations directed toward their communist rival.

Disillusioned Workers

For Liu, the factory worker, his country’s economic miracle is certainly over for now. Until recently, he worked 12 hours a day assembling accessories for DVD players. But then there was less and less work to do, he says, and a while back, the boss informed workers that fewer orders were coming in from Europe.

After the police break up the demonstration, Liu, now daunted, wanders through his city’s dusty streets, passing row upon row of factories and residential buildings. “We just wanted our full wages, but they set the police on us,” he says. He’s lost his faith in the party and the government.

Especially here in the export region of Guangdong, an experimental laboratory of Chinese capitalism, hardly a day goes by without new bankruptcies or protests. The Yue Chen shoe factory in Dongguan, which produces athletic shoes for a parent company in Taiwan that supplies brands such as New Balance, is in a state of emergency. With orders dropping off, the manufacturer has fired 18 managers. Workers have seen overtime pay eliminated, and normal wages are barely enough to live on. Frustration is so high that some shoe factory workers also went to protest in front of city hall. About 10 of them were injured in the clash with police, some young women from the factory report.

The situation outside the gray factory complex is tense. Thugs in plainclothes guard the entrance, photographing and intimidating anyone who talks to the workers. Inside the factory, the showdown between bosses and employees goes on. Workers sit inactive in cheerless factory rooms. The management has switched off the power in some of the halls where workers normally sew and glue together shoes.

In the rest of China as well, more and more assembly lines are grinding to a halt. In Wenzhou in eastern China, a city known for making cheap lighters, shoes and clothes, a large number of business owners are on the run from their creditors, the private shadow banks that last lent them money. Some of these businesspeople even secretly removed machinery from their factories before taking off.

Demand Drop in Europe and China

China’s showcase industries are also feeling the crunch of the drop in European demand. Suntech Power Holdings, for example, which manufactures solar panels in Wuxi, near Shanghai, reported third-quarter losses of $116 million (€87 million). During the same quarter of the previous year, the company generated $33 million in profits.

Just recently, Asia’s champion exporter was the object of admiration from foreign executives and politicians, a victor in the global financial crisis. Some even believed they’d found a superior alternative to crisis-ridden Western-style market economies in Beijing’s authoritarian-style capitalism.

German carmakers, in particular, let themselves be carried away by China’s growth and made enormous investments. China is Volkswagen’s most important market, and the company hopes to sell 2 million cars there by the end of this year.

But the car boom is slowing. “We haven’t received a single new order in nine days,” admits a smartly dressed salesman at Dongguan’s Porsche dealership. “We’ve never experienced that before.” Many business owners are short on cash, he adds. “They used to mostly pay cash, but now they prefer to buy on credit.”

Cheap Chinese brands such as BYD (“Build Your Dreams”) are also having a harder time selling their cars. Important governmental tax incentives for buying cars ran out last year, and major cities such as Beijing are attempting to ease their congested streets by restricting the number of new automobiles. In October, people in China bought roughly 7 percent fewer cars than in the previous month.

Economic Missteps?

At first, it seemed as if Beijing’s state capitalists had found the magic recipe for endless growth. In 2009, they pumped 4 trillion yuan (the equivalent of €430 billion) — China’s largest stimulus package in history — into building ever more modern highways, train stations and airports. Tax incentives led millions of farmers to purchase refrigerators and computers for the first time.

More or less on the party’s orders, banks threw their money at the people’s feet, and local governments were particularly free about getting themselves into debt. By the end of 2010, outstanding debt stood at 10.7 trillion yuan — nearly a quarter of China’s entire economic output.

Much of these funds went, directly or indirectly, into real estate construction. Local governments discovered that selling land for building made for a lucrative source of revenue — and of collateral, so banks would continue to issue new loans. Thousands of farmers were driven off their fields so that villas and apartment buildings could be built.

Many of those development projects, often megalomaniac undertakings from the start, are now ghost towns. In China’s 15 largest cities in October, the number of newly auctioned building plots decreased by 39 percent compared to October 2010.

While many in the West hold out hope that China can solve the euro and dollar debt crisis with its foreign currency holdings, the rift between rich and poor within the country is growing. The “harmonious society” promised by Hu Jintao, head of the government and of the Communist Party, is at risk.

The country’s central bank has increased interest rates five times since mid-2010 to get inflation under control, while at the same time forcing banks to hold larger reserve funds. Beijing hopes this method will allow it to orchestrate a “soft landing” from its own economic boom. But the maneuver entails risks. Along with the construction industry, the motor driving China’s economy up until now, other sectors such as cement production, steelmaking and furniture construction stand to lose vitality as well.

Part 2: Will Rising Middle Class Turn against Government?

If the real estate bubble bursts, it is sure to turn China’s rising middle class against the government. Until now, the nouveau riche has viewed the Communist Party as a guarantee of their own prosperity. Recently, however, outraged apartment owners organized a demonstration in downtown Shanghai, protesting the decline in the value of their property.

Wang Jiang, 28, points to a nearly complete apartment block in Anting, one of the city’s suburbs. The software company manager bought an apartment on the 16th floor of the building for €138,000 in early September. It was a steep price for 82 square meters (883 square feet), especially since the building is located in an industrial area, hemmed in by factories and highways. But Wang was determined to get in on the boom. He didn’t even take the time to view the housing complex before he bought the apartment. Where else, after all, should he have invested his assets, if not in real estate?

Now China’s state-run banks are paying their customers negative interest and Shanghai’s stock market is considered a high-risk casino, where a few major governmental investors are believed to manipulate exchange rates at will.

Wang’s apartment isn’t even finished yet, but he no longer feels any joy about moving in — not now that the real estate company is offering similar apartments in the same complex for about 20 percent less.

Wang feels he was deceived about his apartment’s resale value. “What are they thinking?” he demands. “Surely they can’t just erase a portion of my assets?”

But they can.

Wang and many other furious apartment owners went to the real estate company’s salesroom to protest the drop in value. Suddenly, Wang relates, someone started smashing the miniature models of apartments. After that, in the blink of an eye, the company’s guards grabbed him and hauled the protesters to the police in minibuses. “We were interrogated until 2 a.m. in the morning,” Wang says. Some of the protesters, he adds, are still in prison and authorities won’t tell their families anything.

A Political Quandary

Whether in Dongguan or Shanghai, cracks seem to be forming everywhere in Chinese society. As long as the one-party dictatorship kept growth in the double digits, most people accepted their lack of freedom. Now, though, Beijing is facing a dilemma. Tough police crackdowns will hardly get the consequences of the stagnating economy under control in the long term. But nor are government subsidies enough to stimulate the economy. It seems neither money nor force will help.

Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao recently announced a “fine-tuning” of his economic policy: Banks should grant more generous loans, especially to small and medium-sized export companies, he said.

The economic situation now is far more complicated than it was after the 2008 global financial crisis, says economist Lin Jiang. In 2008, Chinese exports collapsed and roughly 25 million migrant workers had to return from factories to their home provinces.

Back in Dongguan, authorities have no cause at the moment to fear any further protest from Liu, the factory worker. He’s too busy looking for a new place to stay. When he lost his job, he also lost his spot in one of the electronics factory’s residences.

* Liu’s name has been changed by the editors in order to protect his identity.

Source: Spiegl Online, 08.12.2011 By Wieland Wagner

Filed under: China, Countries, News, Risk Management, , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Every Chinese Province bankrupt like Greece – Host Says Chinese Regime nearly bankrupt

China’s economy has a reputation for being strong and prosperous, but according to a well-known Chinese television personality the country’s Gross Domestic Product is going in reverse.

Larry Lang, chair professor of Finance at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, said in a lecture that he didn’t think was being recorded that the Chinese regime is in a serious economic crisis—on the brink of bankruptcy. In his memorable formulation: every province in China is Greece.

Related Article:

Bobsguide - China reduces lenders’ ratio requirements (02.12.2011)
EpochTimes – China’s Economy on the Brink of Collaps (Nov.2011)
The Guardian – IMF sounds warning  on Chinese Banking System (Nov.2011)
 
The restrictions Lang placed on the Oct. 22 speech in Shenyang City, in northern China’s Liaoning Province, included no audio or video recording, and no media. He can be heard saying that people should not post his speech online, or “everyone will look bad,” in the audio that is now on Youtube. 

In the unusual, closed-door lecture, Lang gave a frank analysis of the Chinese economy and the censorship that is placed on intellectuals and public figures. “What I’m about to say is all true. But under this system, we are not allowed to speak the truth,” he said.

Despite Lang’s polished appearance on his high-profile TV shows, he said: “Don’t think that we are living in a peaceful time now. Actually the media cannot report anything at all. Those of us who do TV shows are so miserable and frustrated, because we cannot do any programs. As long as something is related to the government, we cannot report about it.”

He said that the regime doesn’t listen to experts, and that Party officials are insufferably arrogant. “If you don’t agree with him, he thinks you are against him,” he said.

Lang’s assessment that the regime is bankrupt was based on five conjectures.

Firstly, that the regime’s debt sits at about 36 trillion yuan (US$5.68 trillion). This calculation is arrived at by adding up Chinese local government debt (between 16 trillion and 19.5 trillion yuan, or US$2.5 trillion and US$3 trillion), and the debt owed by state-owned enterprises (another 16 trillion, he said). But with interest of two trillion per year, he thinks things will unravel quickly.

Secondly, that the regime’s officially published inflation rate of 6.2 percent is fabricated. The real inflation rate is 16 percent, according to Lang.

Thirdly, that there is serious excess capacity in the economy, and that private consumption is only 30 percent of economic activity. Lang said that beginning this July, the Purchasing Managers Index, a measure of the manufacturing industry, plunged to a new low of 50.7. This is an indication, in his view, that China’s economy is in recession.

Fourthly, that the regime’s officially published GDP of 9 percent is also fabricated. According to Lang’s data, China’s GDP has decreased 10 percent. He said that the bloated figures come from the dramatic increase in infrastructure construction, including real estate development, railways, and highways each year (accounting for up to 70 percent of GDP in 2010).

Fifthly, that taxes are too high. Last year, the taxes on Chinese businesses (including direct and indirect taxes) were at 70 percent of earnings. The individual tax rate sits at 81.6 percent, Lang said.

Once the “economic tsunami” starts, the regime will lose credibility and China will become the poorest country in the world, Lang said.

Several commentators have expressed broad agreement with Lang’s analysis.

Professor Frank Xie at the University of South Carolina, Aiken, said that the idea of China going bankrupt isn’t far fetched. Major construction projects have helped inflate the GDP, he says. “On the surface, it is a big number, but inflation is even higher. So in reality, China’s economy is in recession.”

Further, Xie said that official figures shouldn’t be relied on. The regime’s vice premier, Li Keqiang for example, admitted to a U.S. diplomat that he doesn’t believe the statistics produced by lower-level officials, and when he was the governor of Liaoning Province “had to personally see the hard data.”

Cheng Xiaonong, an economist and former aide to ousted Party leader Zhao Ziyang, said that high praise of the “China model” is often made on the basis of the high-visibility construction projects, a big GDP, and much money in foreign reserves. “They pay little attention to things such as whether people’s basic rights are guaranteed, or their living standard has improved or not,” he said.

Behind the fiat control of the economy, which can have the appearance of being efficient, there is enormous waste and corruption, Cheng said. It means that little spending is done on education, welfare, the health system, etc.

Cheng says that for the last decade the Chinese regime has accumulated its wealth primarily by promoting real estate development, buying urban and suburban residential properties at low prices (or simply taking them), and selling them to developers at high prices.

According to Cheng, the goals of regime officials (to enrich themselves and increase their power) are in direct conflict with those of the people–so social injustice expands, and economic propaganda meant to portray the situation as otherwise prevails.

Few scholars inside the country dare to speak as Lang has, Cheng said. And that’s probably because he has a professorship in Hong Kong.

Source: TheEpochTimes, 15.11.2011

Filed under: Asia, Banking, China, News, Risk Management, , , , , , , , , , , ,

Mexico Credit: Beating Brazil Bonds after 2008 crisis

Mexican government and corporate bonds are outperforming securities sold by their Brazilian counterparts as investors bet Latin America’s second-largest economy is better prepared to weather a global slowdown.

The 27-basis point drop in Mexican government dollar bond yields in the past month compares with a decline of 25 for Brazilian notes, snapping five straight months of underperformance, according to JPMorgan Chase & Co. The two- basis point increase in Mexican corporate borrowing costs in the past month compares with a jump of six basis points, or 0.06 percentage point, for their Brazilian peers. Previously, Brazilian corporate securities had outperformed for two consecutive months.

President Felipe Calderon’s administration has lined up a $72 billion credit line from the International Monetary Fund, extended debt maturities and shunned capital increases embraced by Brazil, the region’s largest economy, to protect against a slowdown in the U.S., which buys 80 percent of the Latin American nation’s exports.

“They are strengthening public finances here in Mexico,” Gabriel Casillas, chief Mexico economist for JPMorgan Chase & Co. in Mexico City, said in a telephone interview. “The Mexican market has become much easier and flexible to trade as Brazil boosts capital controls.”

100-Year Bond

Mexican government bonds yield 4.65 percent, or 6 basis points less than Brazilian debt, according to JPMorgan. The gap has swelled from one basis point on July 28. Notes sold by Mexican companies yield 6.31 percent, compared with 5.93 percent for Brazilian corporate securities. The 37-basis point gap is down from 53 on July 28.

Mexico sold $1 billion of 100-year bonds overseas yesterday, taking advantage of a plunge in benchmark U.S. borrowing costs to bring back a record-long maturity it unveiled a year ago. The government issued the notes due in 2110 to yield 5.96 percent, or 242 basis points above 30-year U.S. Treasuries, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

“Mexico financially has never been as well protected and sound as it is today,” said Alejandro Diaz de Leon, head of the finance ministry’s public debt unit in an interview yesterday. “Mexico has been able to take advantage of a privileged position because of the steps it has taken.”

Standard & Poor’s cut Mexico’s rating to BBB, the second- lowest investment grade, from BBB+ in December 2009, citing declining oil output and “diminishing” prospects for widening the tax base to replace oil revenue. Brazil is rated one level lower at BBB- by S&P.

The Brazilian finance ministry declined to comment in an e- mailed statement.

IMF Credit Line

The IMF renewed and boosted the size of Mexico’s credit line in January from $48 billion. The Washington-based fund originally approved the facility in 2009 to boost confidence in the economy. The central bank has been buying as much as $600 million monthly though options since March 2010 to bolster foreign reserves, which surged 84 percent in the past two years to a record $133.9 billion, according to the central bank. Brazil’s reserves rose 65 percent over the same period to $349.6 billion.

“All these contingency plans and credit lines are favorable factors for an investor, who may say that in the case of another crisis Mexico won’t likely be as volatile,” Eduardo Avila, an economist with Monex Casa de Bolsa SA in Mexico City, said in a telephone interview.

Currency Tumble

The peso tumbled 20 percent in 2008 as U.S. demand for the country’s exports slumped. Mexico’s gross domestic product shrank 6.1 percent the following year, the most since 1995 and the second-worst contraction of the economies tracked by Bloomberg after Russia. The U.S. economy contracted 3.5 percent in 2009.

Yields on Mexican government debt in the two months after Lehman Brothers Holding Inc. filed for bankruptcy in 2008 surged 165 basis points, compared with an increase of 142 for Brazilian securities.

“We are a lot better prepared, especially relative to other countries, for a situation that could deteriorate externally,” Deputy Finance Minister Gerardo Rodriguez said in an interview at Bloomberg’s headquarters in New York on June 2. “All this points to a broad framework of creating additional spaces for a potential adverse scenario going forward. That’s what we are here for — to prepare for negative scenarios.”

Mexico’s total net debt is 35 percent of GDP, below the 40 percent for Brazil. The government has been extending local debt maturities to a record 7.3 years in 2011, from 6.4 years in 2009.

Capital Controls

Brazil imposed a 1 percent tax on some currency derivatives on July 27, the latest government measure aimed at stemming the 42 percent appreciation of the real since the end of 2008. Since October, Brazil has also tripled to 6 percent a tax on foreigners’ purchase of bonds, raised the cost of foreign borrowing by local companies and restricted bank bets against the real. The peso has gained 9.1 percent during the same period.

The extra yield investors demand to hold Mexican government dollar bonds instead of U.S. Treasuries narrowed three basis points to 184 at 7:47 a.m. New York time, according to JPMorgan Chase & Co.

The peso weakened 0.3 percent to 12.5958 per U.S. dollar.

The cost to protect Mexican debt against non-payment for five years rose five basis points yesterday to 161, according to data provider CMA, which is owned by CME Group Inc. and compiles prices quoted by dealers in the privately negotiated market. Credit-default swaps pay the buyer face value in exchange for the underlying securities or the cash equivalent if a government or company fails to adhere to its debt agreements.

Growth Forecasts

Mexico’s central bank lowered its forecast for economic growth this year and next while keeping its consumer price forecasts unchanged, according to its quarterly inflation report published yesterday. It cut its 2011 growth forecast to a range of 3.8 percent to 4.8 percent and its 2012 forecast to 3.5 percent to 4.5 percent. The bank said in its May report the economy may expand as much as 5 percent this year and up to 4.8 percent in 2012 growth. It kept its 2011 and 2012 consumer price forecasts at 3 percent to 4 percent.

“The balance of risks for growth in the Mexican economy has deteriorated,” the bank said in the report, citing lower global growth prospects.

JPMorgan’s Casillas and Iker Cabiedes reduced their 2011 Mexican growth forecast yesterday to 4.2 percent from 4.5 percent.

‘Aversion to Risk’

Economists in Mexico will likely continue to cut growth forecasts this quarter after the Federal Reserve indicated that it will keep rates low through mid-2013, said Javier Belaunzaran, who helps manage about 40 billion pesos at Interacciones Casa de Bolsa SA in Mexico City.

“If the Fed is saying it’s keeping rates steady through 2013, than things aren’t going well at all,” Belaunzaran said in a telephone interview. “There may be an aversion to risk toward long-term securities if the outlook worsens.”

Mexico will wait until November 2012 to raise the benchmark lending rate from a record low 4.5 percent, according to trading in TIIE futures.

While Mexico’s annual inflation rate slowed to a five-year low in March and is within the central bank’s target range of 3 percent to 4 percent this year, Brazil has struggled to contain price increases. Inflation quickened to 6.75 percent last month, the highest in six years and almost double the 3.55 percent rate in Mexico in July.

“There are a lot of factors that make Mexico stand out from the rest of the emerging markets,” Monex’s Avila said.

Source: Bloomberg, 11.08.2011 by  Andres R. Martinez amartinez28@bloomberg.net, David Papadopoulos papadopoulos@bloomberg.net

Filed under: Brazil, Mexico, News, , , , , , , , ,

10 Trends for 2011 by Gerald Celente

After the tumultuous years of the Great Recession, a battered people may wish that 2011 will bring a return to kinder, gentler times. But that is not what we are predicting. Instead, the fruits of government and institutional action – and inaction – on many fronts will ripen in unplanned-for fashions.

Trends we have previously identified, and that have been brewing for some time, will reach maturity in 2011, impacting just about everyone in the world.

1. Wake-Up Call In 2011, the people of all nations will fully recognize how grave economic conditions have become, how ineffectual and self-serving the so-called solutions have been, and how dire the consequences will be. Having become convinced of the inability of leaders and know-it-all “arbiters of everything” to fulfill their promises, the people will do more than just question authority, they will defy authority. The seeds of revolution will be sown….

2. Crack-Up 2011 Among our Top Trends for last year was the “Crash of 2010.” What happened? The stock market didn’t crash. We know. We made it clear in our Autumn Trends Journal that we were not forecasting a stock market crash – the equity markets were no longer a legitimate indicator of recovery or the real state of the economy. Yet the reliable indicators (employment numbers, the real estate market, currency pressures, sovereign debt problems) all bordered between crisis and disaster. In 2011, with the arsenal of schemes to prop them up depleted, we predict “Crack-Up 2011″: teetering economies will collapse, currency wars will ensue, trade barriers will be erected, economic unions will splinter, and the onset of the “Greatest Depression” will be recognized by everyone….

3. Screw the People As times get even tougher and people get even poorer, the “authorities” will intensify their efforts to extract the funds needed to meet fiscal obligations. While there will be variations on the theme, the governments’ song will be the same: cut what you give, raise what you take.

4. Crime Waves No job + no money + compounding debt = high stress, strained relations, short fuses. In 2011, with the fuse lit, it will be prime time for Crime Time. When people lose everything and they have nothing left to lose, they lose it. Hardship-driven crimes will be committed across the socioeconomic spectrum by legions of the on-the-edge desperate who will do whatever they must to keep a roof over their heads and put food on the table….

5. Crackdown on Liberty As crime rates rise, so will the voices demanding a crackdown. A national crusade to “Get Tough on Crime” will be waged against the citizenry. And just as in the “War on Terror,” where “suspected terrorists” are killed before proven guilty or jailed without trial, in the “War on Crime” everyone is a suspect until proven innocent….

6. Alternative Energy In laboratories and workshops unnoticed by mainstream analysts, scientific visionaries and entrepreneurs are forging a new physics incorporating principles once thought impossible, working to create devices that liberate more energy than they consume. What are they, and how long will it be before they can be brought to market? Shrewd investors will ignore the “can’t be done” skepticism, and examine the newly emerging energy trend opportunities that will come of age in 2011….

7. Journalism 2.0 Though the trend has been in the making since the dawn of the Internet Revolution, 2011 will mark the year that new methods of news and information distribution will render the 20th century model obsolete. With its unparalleled reach across borders and language barriers, “Journalism 2.0″ has the potential to influence and educate citizens in a way that governments and corporate media moguls would never permit. Of the hundreds of trends we have forecast over three decades, few have the possibility of such far-reaching effects….

8. Cyberwars Just a decade ago, when the digital age was blooming and hackers were looked upon as annoying geeks, we forecast that the intrinsic fragility of the Internet and the vulnerability of the data it carried made it ripe for cyber-crime and cyber-warfare to flourish. In 2010, every major government acknowledged that Cyberwar was a clear and present danger and, in fact, had already begun. The demonstrable effects of Cyberwar and its companion, Cybercrime, are already significant – and will come of age in 2011. Equally disruptive will be the harsh measures taken by global governments to control free access to the web, identify its users, and literally shut down computers that it considers a threat to national security….

9. Youth of the World Unite University degrees in hand yet out of work, in debt and with no prospects on the horizon, feeling betrayed and angry, forced to live back at home, young adults and 20-somethings are mad as hell, and they’re not going to take it anymore. Filled with vigor, rife with passion, but not mature enough to control their impulses, the confrontations they engage in will often escalate disproportionately. Government efforts to exert control and return the youth to quiet complacency will be ham-fisted and ineffectual. The Revolution will be televised … blogged, YouTubed, Twittered and….

10. End of The World! The closer we get to 2012, the louder the calls will be that the “End is Near!” There have always been sects, at any time in history, that saw signs and portents proving the end of the world was imminent. But 2012 seems to hold a special meaning across a wide segment of “End-time” believers. Among the Armageddonites, the actual end of the world and annihilation of the Earth in 2012 is a matter of certainty. Even the rational and informed that carefully follow the news of never-ending global crises, may sometimes feel the world is in a perilous state. Both streams of thought are leading many to reevaluate their chances for personal survival, be it in heaven or on earth….

See also http://www.trendsresearch.com/forecast.html

Source: Gerald Celente, Trendsresearch, 18.12.2010

Filed under: Banking, Energy & Environment, News, Risk Management, Services, Wealth Management, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Brazil:High Volatility Still Prevailing – December 2010 – IXE BANI-Monthly Analysis

Tension in Europe and USA likely to overshadow positive economic news.
Brazil – Monthly Allocation – December 2010

While key indicators of economic activity in Europe, USA and Asia point to an acceleration of growth in 4Q10, prospects for the international environment up to the year-end cause concern, since chances are that the problems affecting some of the “peripheral” countries in the Euro Zone as well as the USA will continue to weigh on the financial markets. In the Euro Zone, Ireland is likely to remain a major source of volatility in the next few weeks due to the instability of its financial system and the political debility of its current administration.

Nevertheless, even more relevant is the renewed market pressure on Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy, which has led to the resurfacing of fears on the future of the Euro. Meanwhile, in the USA, legislation on temporary tax breaks to individuals expires at the end of this year and must be renewed. However, the Obama administration is likely to face difficulties in rapidly getting this from the new Congress. In all, despite the possible positive news from the economic front, the international environment is likely to weigh on the financial markets.

Main local risk is the deterioration of inflation expectations, while doubts on the economic policy mix might bring volatility
In Brazil, Dilma’s election was expected to maintain a high degree of economic predictability and indeed, the appointment of the new administration’s economic team underscores the perception of continuity. However, some contradictory signs have generated doubts regarding the economic policy mix in the new administration. For example, the pro-cyclical structure of government spending is not aligned with the supposed goal to reduce real interest rates to around 2% to 3% in coming years. Another example of contradiction is Dilma´s  commitment to control inflation vis-avis the pressure on the integration between the Central Bank and the other economic authorities, which might reduce the BCB´s autonomy.

In this context, a decision on the minimum wage, to be taken by the end of the year, and the Central Bank´s attitude towards the deterioration of inflation expectations are key factors and could lead to an increase in market volatility.  Hence, from the point of view of the macro-economic agenda, prospects for the financial markets in the next few weeks appear more uncertain than usual.

In the face of this, we have changed our portfolio by reducing its size by two names, eliminating CSN and Tractebel. We have also substituted Guararapes for Lojas Americanas so as to reap the benefits of Christmas more efficiently, and we have also increased the weights of Bradesco and Hering (both from 5 to 10%).

Source: IXE-Banif, 01.12.2010

Filed under: BM&FBOVESPA, Brazil, Latin America, News, , , , , , , ,

Mexico to Follow US Expectations – August 2010- IXE BANIF – Monthly Analysis

Indications of a slowdown in US growth

Expectations of pick-up in the US economy for 2010 have cooled down recently. The most recent statements of the FED’s President suggested that a recovery in the US will happen only in the medium or long-term. This is a worsening of an already declining expectation for the US economy that started in June, and that we did not incorporate into our scenario at the time.

Until June, nearly everyone’s attention was concentrated on the Euro zone, with fears for the bankruptcy of local banks. These fears faded as the results of a stress test made with a sample of banks showed that very few names were in trouble. The spotlight then turned to the stronger indications of a weakness in the US economy.

Mexico – Monthly Allocation – August 2010

Mexico likely to adapt to new scenario

The Mexican economy continues to depend on its neighbor for exports, as it accounts for most of the demand for its products. With the growing expectation of a reduction in US growth, we believe that the local Mexican economy will tend to migrate from a manufacturing profile (based on exports) to a consumption profile (based on local demand).

While we believe that slower growth of the US economy is not good, we believe that the pace reduction observed so far is still consistent with our current and unchanged expectation for Mexican 2010 GDP growth of 4.4%. We believe that we were in the lower end of the market range, and now believe that others will adjust their expectations downward. In this way, we should move closer to the upper limit of the range of expectations. One indicator on the local economy that we highlight is internal wholesales, which we believe reached its peak at 7% in June (YoY growth, 6.9% in May) and is likely to slow down during the rest of the year. We expect internal wholesales to reach 3.9% for the entire 2010, taking into consideration the negative figures of the first two months of the year. Internal retail sales are now following the wholesales’ trend as an indication that retail companies are reducing inventories. We also expect July figures, when announced, to indicate a reversion of the local deflation observed in the April-June period.

For August, we have added Geo and Chedraui to our suggested portfolio and have withdrawn Asur, Autlan and Urbi.

Filed under: Banking, BMV - Mexico, Exchanges, Latin America, Mexico, News, , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Brazil: Market now with eyes on US growth – August 2010- IXE BANIF – Monthly Analysis

Spotlight moves from the euro zone to the USA

In August, we foresee the financial markets moving their attention from the euro zone to the USA. We also expect China not to have much influence on market performance this month. The results of the bank stress test released in July seem to have calmed the market and caused fears of bankruptcy to fade. The data did not indicate that problems are over, but left the feeling that they are under control with the adjustments made so far. On the other hand, the hopes that the US economy would gain momentum have diminished after the FED’s Presidential speech at the end of July. Given this, we believe that published economic data are likely to drive the market, as they will give a better idea of trends. However, as we do not foresee any data released this month as important enough to change expectations, we believe the market is likely to move sideways.

Brazil – Monthly Allocation – August 2010

Last month, we foresaw a volatile market with no trend for July and based on this belief, compiled our portfolio with a defensive view. Despite this estimate, the market did rally and our portfolio followed the trend, demonstrating that it was able to perform well in upward as well as volatile movements. For this reason, we decided that, as we do not identify any definite catalyst driving the market in August, we would change our portfolio very little and continue our defensive view. We have reduced the weights on Bradesco and Hering (from 10% to 5% each) due to their recent stellar performance. We have also substituted Tietê for Eletropaulo, with the same weight, and added Telesp.

Focus on slowdown of US economy

The latest indications of a slowdown in the US economy point to a 2.5% GDP growth for 2010, from a previous 2.7%. This reduction, although immaterial, cooled down previous expectations of upward revisions in estimates and turned attention to stimulating growth. On August 10, attention should focus on the FOMC meeting to see if a change in the monetary policy is possible. However, with interest rates already close to zero, there is probably little to be done on this front. Monitoring the labor market (unemployment and payroll) is perhaps the best hope for investors to find economic improvement.

The real start of the Brazilian Presidential race

On August 17, presidential candidates will start their TV campaigns. Although candidates have been campaigning on the road for a while, many people see TV campaigns as the most important and decisive part of the presidential race, so voting polls that start after this are closely followed and should affect the market. Another potential source for market stress is the end of the low inflation period (last two months, caused by food prices) that we foresee for August. Although we expect inflation to remain at around 0.4% per month until December, people may view any rebound negatively.

Source: BANIF – IXE, 02.08.2010

Filed under: BM&FBOVESPA, Brazil, Exchanges, Latin America, News, Wealth Management, , , , , , , , , , , ,

China’s banking sector Serious Problem with Bad Loans

Professor Pettis at Peking University explains that“in China, even if you believe that all the NPLs currently in the banking system have been correctly identified (a claim which few Chinese bankers believe), no one doubts we are about to see a surge in NPLs thanks to the out-of-control lending expansion of the past two years.  But things are even worse than the nominal numbers imply.  As I discussed in my April 6 entry, when we are trying to estimate the cost of a banking crisis we need to think about more than simply the ability of borrowers to meet current obligations.

This is because, as in the case of the Japanese government obligations, when borrowers are able to benefit from artificially low interest rates, the effect is of hidden debt forgiveness which must be paid for by the net lenders, who are, as in the case of Japan, the beleaguered households.  In other words, if you want to know how much real bad debt there is out there that must be cleaned up, you need to calculate what share of the loans would go bad if interest rates were raised by at least 300-400 basis points, the minimum needed to bring Chinese interest rates in line with an appropriate rate.  This suggests that the Chinese banks, if obligations were correctly counted, might have much larger amounts of bad debt than any of us realize, and this needs directly or indirectly to be cleaned up.”

Here are some recent reports from financial press sources regarding the health China’s banking sector:

-”SHANGHAI -(Dow Jones)- The non-performing loan ratio in China’s banking industry declined to 1.58% by the end of 2009, 0.84 percentage point lower than the figure at the beginning of 2009, China’s banking regulator said Saturday.”(1)

-”BEIJING: Chinese financial institutions’ non-performing loans (NPL) ratio edged down 0.1 percentage points to 1.48 percent in January, the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) said Friday.”(2)

-”BEIJING, Apr 14, 2010 (SinoCast Daily Business Beat via COMTEX) — Non-performing loan (NPL) ratio of China Development Bank, a policy bank, had reached 0.85% by the end of March”(3)

I don’t believe those reported percentages are accurate.

For context, here is an analysis of China’s non performing loan issue from 2002:

“Standard and Poor’s (S&P), which rates China as investment grade, said on Thursday it would take Chinese banks 10 to 20 years to cut average non-performing loans (NPLs) ratio to a manageable five per cent.

It estimates the Chinese banking sector’s average NPL ratio is atleast 50 per cent, higher than the 30 per cent estimate of China’s central bank governor Dai Xianglong.

“The cost of necessary write-offs could be equivalent to $518 billion or almost half of China’s estimated gross domestic product of $1.1 trillion for 2001,” Mr Terry Chan, a S&P director in Hong Kong said.

The agency said China would be unlikely to cut NPLs in its banking sector to 15 per cent within five years, as its central bank wishes, given the current operating performance of the sector.”

I seriously doubt that the problem identified in 2002 has been resolved yet.  There is an analysis here that supports my assertion.

Source:SinoRock, 07.07.2010

Filed under: Banking, China, News, Risk Management, , , , , , , , , , , , ,

China: The collapse of the Asian growth model

Over the last three decades there has been a dramatic shift in the stance of development policy with import-substitution being replaced by the export-led growth. A significant concern with this latter model is that it may risk turning global growth into a zero-sum game. This can happen if one country’s export growth comes by poaching of domestic demand elsewhere or by displacing exports of other countries.

China on ‘Treadmill to Hell’ Amid Bubble, Chanos, Faber, Rogoff Say

Rather than focusing on production for domestic markets, countries were advised to focus on production for export. This shift away from import-substitution toward the export-led growth was driven significantly by the economic troubles that emerged in the 1970s. At that time many developing countries, who had prospered under regimes of import-substitution, began to experience slower growth and accelerated inflation.
This led to claims that the import-substitution model had exhausted itself, and that the easy possibilities for growth by substitution had been used up.second factor fostering adoption of the export-led model was the shift in intellectual outlook amongst economists in favor of market directed economic activity. Import-substitution requires government provided tariff and quota protections, and economists increasingly came to portray these measures as economic distortions that contribute to productive inefficiency and rent seeking.
The shift in policy stance was also propelled by the empirical fact of Japan’s spectacular success in growing its economy in the twenty five years after World War II, and by the subsequent growth success of the four east Asian “tiger” economies – South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. All of these economies relied on increased exports.

The problem is that the export-led growth model suffers from a fallacy of composition whereby it assumes that all countries can grow by relying on demand growth in other countries. When the model is applied globally in a demand-constrained world, there is a danger of a beggar-thy-neighbor outcome in which all try to grow on the backs of demand expansion in other countries, and the result is global excess supply and deflation. In this connection, it is not exporting per se that is the problem, but rather making exports the focus of development. Countries will still need to export to pay for their imported capital and intermediate goods needs, but exporting should be organized so as to maximize its contribution to domestic development and not viewed as an end in itself.
Export led growth model prompts countries to shift ever more output onto global markets, and in doing so aggravates the long-standing trend deterioration in developing country terms of trade. This pattern partakes of a vicious cycle since declining terms of trade and falling prices compel developing countries to export even more, thereby compounding the downward price pressure. This vicious cycle has long been visible for producers of primary commodities. However, as a result of the transfer of manufacturing capacity to developing countries who lack the consumer markets to buy their own output, the same process may now be present in all but highest-end manufacturing.
In the 1950′s, Western opinion leaders found themselves both impressed and frightened by the extraordinary growth rates achieved by an Eastern economy, although it was still substantially poorer and smaller than those of the West.
The speed with which it had transformed itself from a peasant society into an industrial powerhouse, and it’s perceived ability to achieve growth rates several times higher than the advanced nations, seemed to call into question the dominance not only of Western power but of Western ideology.
The leaders of that nation did not share Western faith in free markets or unlimited civil liberties. They asserted with increasing self-confidence that their system was superior: societies that accepted strong, even authoritarian governments and are willing to limit individual liberties in the interest of the common good, take charge of their economies, and sacrifice short-run consumer interests for the sake of long-run growth that would eventually outperform the increasingly chaotic societies of the West.
China’s economic growth has averaged 9pc a year over the past 10 years, compared with a paltry 1.9pc for the British economy. Last year, despite the credit crunch, China posted a remarkable growth rate of 10.7pc against a British contraction of 3.2pc.some are extrapolating present trends forward, and proclaiming that China will usurp the United States as the world’s largest economy.
However, in the absence of expanding foreign demand for its exports, it has instead come to rely on a massive surge in domestic bank lending to fuel its growth rate. When measured relative to the size of its economy, the 27pc point jump in bank loans to GDP is unprecedented; at no point in history has a nation ever attempted such an incredible increase in state-directed bank lending.
This appetite for cheap Chinese exports, which had at one point seemed insatiable, means that the West has come to owe China over 2 trillion $. China has become the world’s biggest creditor, but creditor nations running persistent trade surpluses has two historical examples. The US economy in the Twenties and the Japanese economy in the Eighties.
In both of the previous examples a failure to allow exchange rates to adjust to the new reality created a large speculative pool of credit that, in turn, led to overvalued domestic assets and, eventually, an economic crisis.
The banks in China are lending money at breakneck speed, but China’s state planners have favoured investment over consumption. High-speed rail networks, first-class infrastructure projects and the urban migration of 55 million people every year are common explanations for the ability of the nimble Chinese to overcome the frailties of this global economy. But the goal of economic policy, is to maximise households’ wellbeing and consumption. Unfortunately, and China’s share of consumption within its economy has fallen relentlessly, reaching 35pc of GDP in 2008.
In China, investment spending has tripled since 2001 and the consequences are staggering. A country that represents just 7pc of global GDP is now responsible for 30pc of global aluminum consumption, 47pc of global steel consumption and 40pc of global copper consumption. The overriding problem is that the Chinese model leads to a deflationary spiral that is perpetual in nature. Domestic consumption never grows fast enough to absorb the supply, prompting the planners to commit to ever-higher levels of investment. Over-capacity inevitably plagues many sectors of the economy and Chinese profitability is already low.

The story in China has been one of imperiled, marginally profitable enterprises relying on generous state-provided incentives for utilities, credit, etc. now having to deal with slowing global demand. The drying up of trade finance isn’t helping, either. The giant stimulus worldwide, and especially in China, helped the world economy for one year but that has now dried up.

Source and full article at  Israel Financial Experts, 08.06. 2010,

Filed under: Asia, China, Energy & Environment, Hong Kong, News, Risk Management, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Brazil: Volatile Market with no Trend – June 2010- IXE BANIF – Monthly Analysis

Focus spread over euro zone
Last month, we correctly anticipated that the Greek problem would negatively dominate the markets. However, we did not anticipate that fears would spread severely over to other countries, especially the other PIIGS members (Portugal, Italy, Ireland and Spain). After the sharp negative effect on all markets worldwide, we believe that investors continue to be sensitive, with wounds still open and, in the absence of any concrete positive news in June, markets are likely to remain tense, volatile and with no definite short-term trend. This expectation only differs from our view for the previous month in the lack of trend. We chose our suggested portfolio last month to remain defensive, and believe this is also the best choice for June, which is why we have made hardly any modifications. We have only withdrawn Tim, which was the month’s largest winner, and transferred its weight to CSN to keep the weight of the steel industry close to its weight in the Ibovespa. With this move, our portfolio has weights similar of those at the Ibovespa for the oil, mining, banks, steel, transportation and telecom industries, while we keep retail and utilities overweight.

Euro zone pros and cons
For the Euro zone, we highlight some important points. Positives: a) Economic activity in the main countries is not weak; b) Announcement of important measures directed toward stability in Portugal, Spain and Italy. Negatives: a) growth is likely to remain low for at least the next few years; b) risk rating downgrades might occur, particularly for banks, if tension continues at its current level or worsens and c) country debts are likely to stabilize at high levels. From 2008 to 2013, gross debt to GDP ratio will increase in most countries. Based on the assumptions of the European Commission, this ratio for Portugal should go from 66% to 90%, for Spain from 40% to 75%, Ireland from 44% to 93%, Italy from 106% to 118% and Greece from 99% to 135%.

Signs from other regions remain positive
In other regions, the economic trend continues to improve. In the US, the Fed revised its GDP growth estimate upwards to 3.5% for 2010 and we believe recovery is likely to continue slowly but surely. In China, the economy continues strong and on the verge of overheating, although inflation has not surpassed the official 3% limit and we see no reason for any change in course. Finally, in Brazil we also see strong signs of good and unchanged economic activity. At the announcement on June 8 of 1Q GDP we expect a 2.5% non-annualized growth that, if confirmed, would strongly support our estimate of a 7.0% growth for FY2010. On June 9, we anticipate announcement of the IPCA inflation index for May, which we expect to reach 0.45% (for June figures we expect a sharp reduction to around 0.3% that, if confirmed, would increase confidence in the growth trend of the GDP). On the same day, we expect announcement of the official Selic interest rate, when we anticipate another 0.75% hike as part of a measure to avoid the deterioration of the outlook for inflation.

See  full report Brazil_-_Monthly_Allocation_-_June_2010

Source: IXE Banif, 01.06.2010

Filed under: BM&FBOVESPA, Brazil, Exchanges, Latin America, News, Risk Management, , , , , , , , , , , ,

China to lead Asian distressed debt opportunity in 2010

Domestic bank credit acts in a similarly pro-cyclical way to foreign debt. When growth is booming, credit growth hides bad loans in favorable nonperforming loan ratios because assets are growing so fast – leading to a booming economy.
The problems show up if a macro shock of some sort intervenes. In the case of China, the shock will be a combination of higher inflation and interest rates. As growth slows, NPLs appear, banks pull back on loan expansion, and growth slows even more, creating a new wave of NPLs. Superficially “safe” NPL ratios suddenly reverse dramatically and risk sinking the whole macro ship.
 
http://asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2283&Itemid=422
 
In Shanghai, outstanding loans to the real estate industry accounts for 27 percent of the total outstanding loans, according to Yan Qingmin, head of Shanghai Branch of China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC).
“The non-performing loan (NPL) ratio in Shanghai’s commercial housing development loans kept rising in 2009,” Yan warned.
 
http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90778/90859/6888068.html

Source: CHINDA, 04.02.2010

Filed under: Asia, Banking, China, Risk Management, Services, , , , , ,

Goldman Sachs ‘to monitor potential Asian real estate bubbles’

Fred Hu, Goldman Sachs’s chairman of Greater China, has said that the financial institution’s operations in Asia are keeping a close eye on the development of potential real estate bubbles.

Among the countries causing the most concern to Goldman Sachs are Hong Kong, Singapore and China, Mr Hu said.

China recorded its highest growth in property prices for 18 months in December, Singapore saw a record number of residential real estate sales in 2009 and Hong Kong house prices currently stand at their highest point in more than a decade, reports Bloomberg.

Mr Hu gave a particular warning about growth in Hong Kong and Singapore.  “I would be very skeptical about this kind of pace,” he said.

Last week, it was reported that Goldman Sachs is close to selling off a luxury real estate development in Shanghai. It is to sell the Shanghai Garden Plaza to Chinese property developer Shanghai Forte Land for $200 million, people close to the deal told Reuters.

Source: Bobsguide, 18.10.2010

Filed under: Asia, China, Hong Kong, News, Risk Management, Singapore, , , , , , , , , ,

Energy: Don’t Believe Long-Term Oil Forecasts

On 4 October 2009, The Wall Street Journal ran an article World Need for Oil Expected to Ease (subscription might be required), where the author, Spencer Swartz, wrote:

The International Energy Agency next week will make a “substantial” downward revision to its long-term forecast for global oil demand, a person familiar with the matter said, marking the second year running the group has slashed its view of the world’s thirst for oil.

If demand pessimists are correct, future increases in the price of crude could be damped as weaker consumption stretches world oil supply by billions of barrels. Various analyst estimates maintain that the roughly 2% a year average growth rate in world oil consumption seen earlier this decade — the biggest reason for crude prices hitting a record $147 a barrel last year — may turn out to be an anomaly and that annual growth in the neighborhood of 0.5% to 1% is more the norm.

The reality is that no one knows what the long term future holds. The IEA itself struggles with the Bull versus Bear oil outlook. Ask yourself, how many pundits foresaw the mess we are in now and anticipated the dramatic easing of oil demand?

Sure, one can gather relevant information and make a reasonable guess as to oil demand next year and the year after that. But after five years, the potential paths of demand growth become unwieldy. How will economic growth be sustained over the next five years? Will the OECD countries lag emerging countries? Will China and the rest of Asia power ahead and create substantial demand? If Asian countries do power ahead and create many millions of middle class citizens, will they demand their own vehicles and tickets on jet planes to see the world? Will Brazil and other South American countries enjoy strong economic growth? Will the Middle East be stable over this period? Will Iraq resume its full production capabilities? As you see, one can begin asking any number of questions that are impossible to answer with an accuracy or certainty and that might have a major bearing on demand or supply or both.

What do we know? We know that for a long time, oil prices were usually within $20-$30 real per barrel. Now those prices are laughable. No reasonable person expects the world to return to those prices any time soon. Many major oil fields around the world are in decline. Oil companies are searching in more remote and sometimes more unfriendly regions of the world to develop further existing fields and to discover new fields. And, the rise of oil prices has given new prominence to some national oil companies. A sample list, though incomplete, of companies include: Gazprom OAO (OGZPY.PK), Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A., and Petróleo Brasileiro S.A. – Petrobras (PBR).

If we were to accept the 1% annual growth of oil demand mentioned in the WSJ quote for a long duration, what would that mean or imply? A child born tomorrow will see by her seventieth birthday a doubling of daily world oil production from about 85 million barrels per day to 170 million barrels per day. Moreover, during her seventy years, the world will have produced more during that time than the total cumulative amount prior to her birth. Call me a skeptic, but I am unable to see where we would find that much additional oil to produce at such high rates for such a sustained period.

To be clear, neither the article nor the IEA is suggesting that we endure a 1% growth forever. Rather, I wanted to use this seemingly small innocuous number of only 1% growth to draw attention to its implication. If the long term growth were 2%, then in 35 years the daily world oil production would double to 170 million barrels per day and the oil produced during those 35 years would exceed the prior total cumulative amount of oil produced.

I recommend two excellent sources of information to learn more about oil, oil demand, oil prices and various policy initiatives:

  • Statistical Review of World Energy from BP p.l.c. (BP). I found the link to the Adobe pdf document toward to the bottom on its homepage.
  • Monthly Oil Market Report from the International Energy Agency. The link is to the webpage that hosts the document that is released two weeks after the initial release date. Subscribers receive immediate access through a different link.

Both documents are extremely helpful. I find the BP document provides concise information and historical context. The IEA document provides the agency’s latest thinking and forecasts.

As the world struggles to find new sources of oil, there will be dramatic changes. I have already discussed some questions we should ask ourselves as we contemplate future oil demand growth. Of course, many more questions need to be considered. And I have indicated that some national oil companies have gained strength and prominence with higher oil demand and prices. As investors, we should also think about what long term oil demand growth means for oil sands companies such as Suncor Energy, Inc. (SU) and Canadian Oil Sands Trust (COSWF.PK), and for large multinationals such as ConocoPhillips Company (COP), Chevron Corporation (CVX), and Exxon Mobil Corporation (XOM).

As demand continues to rise, I am curious what will happen. Will scientific breakthroughs help? How will the world cope with the environmental consequences? How will people adapt to possibly much higher prices? How will countries and regions change because of either having or lacking domestic oil supplies? If the world does experience higher prices, what are the implications for global world trade? And do higher prices imply that people will travel less and have less of an understanding of other regions? These questions are just a small sample of what investors should begin considering.

A few years ago, Professor Bartlett gave a compelling lecture, captured in a series of YouTube videos, to some students at the University of Colorado. In his lecture, he discussed oil demand growth. The lecture starts a bit slow; however, when you reach the latter part of the third video, you’ll see how the prior information is relevant to his discussion on oil. In other words, because they are important, don’t skip the initial video segments and jump to the third. I urge you to watch the complete video series.

And after you’ve watched the videos, ask yourself, “What time is it?” This question will make sense once you’ve seen the videos.

When I initially saw the WSJ article, I was drawn by the long term forecasts. My personal bias is that most longer term things in life are difficult, if not impossible, to forecast with any reasonable degree of accuracy. Then as I read the article, I saw the 1% growth number, which by itself seems very innocuous. But if you think about what 1% growth means over a long and sustained period, you quickly realize there are going to be changes. Moreover, the world has already witnessed a significant shift in oil prices over the last decade. We are no longer in our prior historical norm of $20-$30 per barrel. Some might argue that we are now in unchartered territory. As part of that possible unchartered territory, I wanted you to think about some larger questions. The questions mentioned in this article are just off the top of my head without much thought. I am sure you can think of many more. And last, I wanted to draw your attention to Professor Bartlett’s excellent lecture. His lecture will make you think about oil demand (and others) growth differently. I hope this article causes you to further your own research.

Source: Seeking Alpha, 08.11.2009

Filed under: Brazil, China, Energy & Environment, Mexico, News, Risk Management, Venezuela, Vietnam, , , , , , , , , , ,

SinoRock new star in China’s bank related assets/debts market

China’s NPL (Non-Performinb Loan) market is getting bigger, but the business model is changing to favore services-oriented local manager who have a large, local, sustainable and scalable operation throughout China.  Sino-Rock Investment Management Co Ltd based in HK brings a new dimension to NPL and Distressed Funds for Private Equity and Investors, with indepth knowhow, experience and understanding relations in China and the markets.  With the backing of its major shareholder Cinda (China’s largest AMC of NPLs), SinoRock is on the way to become the new star manager in China’s bank related assets/debts.

Foreign managers are losing NPL legal battles because their legal-battle oriented strategy is not working due to new policies and local cultures.  If NPL investment could be done by fighting legal battles, everyone could hire lawyers to fight legal battles to make profits.  That’s not the case  in China.

Source: SinoRock, October 2009

Additional News on China’s growing bank related assets/debts

Filed under: Asia, Banking, China, News, Services, Wealth Management, , , , , , , , , , ,

Currencies: A Front Line for Global Balance

Fluctuating currency values can make or break foreign exchange traders. On a far wider scale, they affect global economic balance.

(Caijing Magazine) Anyone who has read the Chinese bestseller Currency Wars by Song Hongbing knows about the conspiracy theory that says currencies can be used as instruments of war. As one who witnessed the turmoil among Asian currencies during the 1998 Asian financial crisis, I can confirm that currency speculation can be highly profitable for some traders in over-the-counter and thinly regulated markets.

Even today, I would not encourage anyone to take up foreign exchange trading. Accumulator products that bet on currency volatility are famously called “I’ll kill you later” with good reason: You might never have enough collateral to pay for margin calls, and your counter-party actually has the option to foreclose and crystallize your losses. Read contracts very carefully and make sure a contract seller discloses how much collateral you have to pay when prices hit certain levels.

As far as I am aware, no central bank has yet been able to launch regulatory cases against insider trading or market manipulation involving currencies. That’s because currencies are traded in pairs. Unless both central banks and/or financial regulators overseeing a pair of traded currencies are willing to help with an investigation, it’s unlikely that any investigation targeting market manipulation in this area would succeed.

However, the current financial crisis has convinced financial regulators around the world that naked short-selling during a crisis can have harmful effects, and that markets are not as innocent as free market fundamentalists claim.

The trouble with foreign exchange markets is that a mouse in a large market can be an elephant in a small market, so that a large speculator (or group of them) can move prices fairly quickly unless central banks supervising these markets are willing to cooperate to stop market manipulation activities. Until recently, major central banks tended to shun market intervention.

Yet the importance of currency values exceeds the forex trading sphere. I was reminded of this while returning from a think-tank conference in New Delhi recently, when it came to my attention that global imbalance is once again a hot topic. Some are again trying to blame Asia for saving too much money, claiming Asian saving habits caused the current crisis. It’s the same excuse we hear when a banker blames his non-performing loans on depositors who save too much.

Anyone interested in the technical issues of global imbalance should read the famous debate between Stanford University Professor Ron McKinnon and Michael Mussa, former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund, published by the Bank of International Settlements Working Papers (http://www.bis.org/publ/work277.htm). McKinnon argued China should maintain stable exchange rates to anchor monetary policy while concentrating on fiscal policy to deal with its balance of payment surpluses. Mussa, on the other hand, argued that a revaluation of the yuan is necessary for an adjustment that steers the world away from global imbalance.

The debate turns on the question of whether the U.S. current account deficit is structural and can be resolved through devaluation. By definition, conventional economic theory assumes this means non-U.S. currencies should revaluate. Proponents of this line of thinking, therefore, think Asian currencies should be revalued significantly.

As Nomura Chief Economist Richard Koo argues quite convincingly in his new book The Holy Grail of Macroeconomics – Lessons from Japan’s Great Recession, the Japanese crisis and the current crisis can be described as balance sheet recessions. The trouble with the flexible exchange rate argument is that the Japanese yen has revalued significantly, with hardly any effect on the U.S. current account deficit, implying there are structural reasons for the deficit that must be dealt with through fiscal and non-monetary policy measures.

This comes back to the Triffin Dilemma, which explains why a reserve currency country faces a conflict between its domestic monetary policy and global liquidity needs. If a reserve currency country tightens monetary policy, large capital inflows will negate monetary tightening policy moves. Raising interest rates will make exchange rates stronger and encourage more imports. It’s a contradiction that says the stronger the dominant reserve currency, the stronger is global growth. But the larger the deficit, the less sustainable is the situation.

So in a globalized world of free-flowing capital, a reserve currency country’s monetary policy is largely ineffective. When that country is unwilling to adopt a tight fiscal policy, a current account deficit is a consequence. So why should the blame fall on foreigners who have no say in a reserve currency country’s policy decisions?

This is why Nobel laureate Robert Mundell and others have argued that we should have a single, global reserve currency to replace the current use of four, major reserve currencies in the SDR, in which with the U.S. dollar accounts for roughly 66 percent, euro 25 percent, pound 5 percent and yen 4 percent. A single, global reserve currency would mean the world would become one currency area. This would prevent nations from quarrelling about trade deficits, just as California does not fuss over a deficit or surplus with Texas.

However, since it is unlikely that any sovereign nation will be willing to cede power to a global central bank, a global financial regulator and a global taxation regime that taxes winners and compensates losers, that goal is many years away.

The current recession has already shrunk the U.S. current account deficit to 3 percent of GDP, but the funding requirements of the growing fiscal deficit are rising. This is where Koo’s book is quite helpful in explaining how complicated the world has become, since the Japanese experience shows that a balance sheet recession throws conventional economic theory out the window.

I am convinced that conventional theory has put too much emphasis on the monetary and financial side of the analysis, and not enough on what is happening to the real, structural side of the world’s economies.

Andrew Shen is a guest economist of Caijing and former Chairman of Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission.

Source: Caijing, 26.10.2009

Filed under: News, Risk Management, Services, , , , , , , , , , , ,

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